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Abstract
1
. 
Securitization has become prevalent in many countries, and has substantial impact on government 
monetary policy and fiscal policy which have not yet been adequately analyzed in the existing literature.  This 
article develops optimal conditions for efficient securitization, identifies constraints on securitization, and analyzes 
the interactions of capital-reserve requirements and securitization.  This article introduces new decision models 
and theories of asset-securitization.   
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1. Existing Literature On Securitization. 
Securitization (see: Nwogugu (2005a, 2005b); Schwarcz (2004)) has radically changed the structure of the 
housing, banking, real estate and other industries, and is assumed to reduce the cost of borrowing in various 
industries because it increases money available for lending.  Most securitizations are “secondary-market 
securitizations”, where banks and financial institutions buy existing assets and then securitize them – this is very 
different from “primary-market securitization” where borrowing ‘new’ capital (secured by assets not already 
owned) is the primary objective.  Relevant issues are discussed in: DeMarzo (2005); Riddiough (2000); Ambrose 
(2000); Sing, Ong, Fan & Sirmans (2004); Krainer (2002); Nofhaft & Freund (2003); Naranjo & Toevs (2003); 
Passmore, Sparks & Ingpen (2002); Glaeser & Kallal (1997); Heuson, Passmore & Sparks (2001); Ghiradato & 
Marinacci (2001); Mansini & Pferschy (2004); Mansini & Speranza (2002); Schwarcz (2002); Schwarcz (2004); 
DeYoung & Rice (2004); Browning, Gronsberg & Liu (____); David (1997); DeMarzo (2005); Jobst (June 2003); 
Calomiris & Mason (2004); Shakespeare (2001); Sitkoff (2003); Thomas (June 2001); Iacobucci & Winter (2005); 
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Mahul (2001); Van Order R (___); Dam (Feb 2006); Kaiser & Tumma (2004);  Van Order (___);  Cox, Fairchild 
& Pedersen (2000); Winton (2001); Siegl & Tichy (2000); Doherty & Schlesinger (2002); Fan, Sing & Ong & 
Sirmans (2004); Cooper (2001); Carnahan (2005); Murray (2001); Kupiec & Nickerson (2004); Nothaft & Freund 
(2003); Batchvarov, Hani & Davies (2002); Kollar (1999); Dionne & Harchaoui (May 2003); Thomas (June 2001); 
Cook & Hendershott (1978); Bothwell & Merrill (Feb. 2005); Campbell & Hercowitz (Jan. 2006); Herring & 
Chatusripitak (2001); Turner (_____);Cowley & Cummins (2005); Dalton & Dziobek (2005); Ferguson (Sept. 
2003); Ghosh, Nachane, Narain & Sahoo (2003); Haggard, Thompson & Colonna (2000); Han (1996); Herzog 
(2006); Illing & Paulin (August 2004); Miller (1998); Pennachi (2006); Piga (2000); Pollin (1991); Ramey & 
Shapiro (1997); Riddiough (1997); Rogerson (1987); Smith & Wang (2006); Van Der Heuvel (1999); Vymyatnina 
(2006); Fleisig (June 1996); Anderson, Gilbert & Powell (1989); Ketkar & Ratha (Nov. 2004).  Also see: Roberts 
& Pashler (Sept. 2005); Granger, King & White (1995).      
However, the existing literature on asset-securitization does not analyze the following issues:   
1) The conditions under which securitization reduce banks’ probabilities of bankruptcy.     
2) Securitization within the context of monitoring costs.    
3) Empirical studies of securitization omitted the following: a) incorporation of monitoring costs, b) the 
impact of sources of capital (bank deposits, Fed Funds, pension funds, etc.) on the decision to securitize, c) the 
impact of investor risk tolerance, perceptions of the economy on the choice between ABS/MBS and other 
investments, d) the conditions under which yields spreads from securitization will remain positive; e) the 
conditions under which banks are better of syndicating loans instead of securitizing them, e) distinctions between 
secondary-securitizations and primary-securitizations in the data used in empirical studies, f) distinctions between 
transaction time (time taken to originate, structure and sell ABS/MBS), across different securitization transactions,  
g) the industry/asset effect – the impact of securitization is very likely to vary across industries and assets; h) the 
performance of ABS/MBS over time is not adjusted for inflation and changes in interest rates.                 
4) The effect of knowledge and knowledge management on the securitization process within banks and 
institutional investors.  Securitization is a specialized financing technique and only a relatively small number of 
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financial institution employees can manage such transactions.  Furthermore, although a significant portion of 
processes are automated, the quality still depends on the validity/quality of the computer programs.   
5) The optimal volume of securitization for any specific bank.  
6) Most of the empirical studies on securitization suffer from the data validation, methodological and 
theory testing problems explained in Roberts & Pashler (2005). 
7) Another critical issue is the classification of securitizations as true-sales or as assignments (financing), 
which has significant tax and accounting ramifications.  The criteria for classification as a true sale are stated in 
Financial Accounting Standards #140 (FAS 140, September 2000) – “Accounting for Transfers And Servicing Of 
Financial Assets And Extinguishment Of Liabilities”.  For classification as a true sale, FAS requires that the 
sponsor must not have any control over the collateral, and that the SPV be a qualifying SPV (QSPV).  FASB 
Interpretation #46 (FIN 46, December 2003) states the criteria for qualification as an SPV (FIN 46 does not apply 
to SPVs).  However, the existing literature contains somewhat very divergent views about the quality of 
classification criteria (criteria proposed both by FASB, SEC and private entities/persons), the economic impact of 
such classifications and the type of sanctions required to reduce propensity for fraud.   
 
2. Models Of Securitization. 
Although securitization as practiced in the US, is technically illegal under US law [see: Nwogugu (2005); 
Schwarcz (2004)], the volume of securitization transactions and associated journal articles continue to increase.  
This section develops models of securitization (under US laws) with the objective of determining the conditions 
under which securitization is beneficial or non-beneficial to banks.  The type of securitization analyzed here is one 
in which the bank/sponsor pools its assets and then securitizes them.  The principles and formulas can be applied to 
various types of loans, credit card pools, leases, intellectual property and other types of assets.  Since Prepayment 
Rates and the volume of prepaid assets in ABS transactions are relatively small compared to total ABS dollar 
volume, one approach is to completely omit ABS Prepayment-Rates when determining the optimal conditions for 
securitization.  In all true-sale securitizations, the sponsor/bank will have typically made most of its profits before 
Prepayment rates become an issue.  In assignment securitizations, the sponsor-bank will also have made substantial 
profits before Prepayments become an issue.  Prepayments and changes in Prepayment rates have not been 
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negative considerations to ABS investors, who typically understand prepayment mechanics and how to hedge 
them.  Hence, for most financial institutions, the decision about whether or not to securitize is almost independent 
of ABS Prepayment Rates.  Mansini & Speranza (2002); Mansini & Pferschy (2004); Murray (2001); Passmore & 
Sparks (2000); Winton (2001).  On dynamical systems, see: Beer (2000); Dellnitz & Junge (1999); Moore (1991); 
Friedman & Sandler (1996); Iacus (2001); Van Gelder (1998); Naranjo & Toevs (2003).         
 
Let: 
Ib = interest rate paid by banks to obtain deposits  
Ii = average interest rate paid by borrowers on mortgage loans 
If = banks’ cost of borrowing funds from the Federal Reserve (Central Bank) 
Is = PV of Interest paid on securitized debt, expressed as a percentage of the debt   
Ispv = Interest rate for securitized debt  
Ilc = PV of a bank’s average transaction cost to make a loan – includes overhead, fixed costs per transaction and 
variable costs per transaction; expressed as a percentage of the loan amount. 
Im = expected monitoring costs to monitor a loan that was not securitized; expressed as a percentage of the loan 
amount. 
Ims = expected monitoring costs to monitor a loan that was securitized; expressed as a percentage of the loan 
amount. 
Its = transaction costs to securitize a loan; amortized over loan term and then expressed as a percentage of the loan 
amount. 
Ig = a bank’s spread on a loan without securitization – including operating expenses 
Igs = a bank’s spread on a loan with securitization (including monitoring costs and operating expenses). 
Il = average expected percentage credit loss per un-securitized loan (expressed as a percentage of the loan amount). 
Ils = average expected percentage credit loss per securitized loan (expressed as a percentage of the loan amount). 
Ir = average residual rate in securitized transactions = Ir = (Ii-Is) 
Irc = average expected percentage credit loss on securitized debt 
Ici = average cost of credit insurance in securitization; (expressed as a percentage of the loan amount). 
Ics = average profits earned from syndicating unsecuritized loan; amortized over loan term and expressed as 
percentage of loan principal. 
Idr = average periodic post default cost of loan resolution; (expressed as a percentage of the loan amount). 
P = loan amount.  
S = percentage of loan securitized. S = 1 in true-sales securitizations. S  (0,1) 
Ss = percentage of original loan realized as new loan in securitization. Ss  S. 
Si = gain or loss on sale expressed as a percentage of the loan balance (applies only if transaction is deemed a true 
sale).  
Tts  = bank’s tax rate in true-sale securitization 
Ta  = bank’s tax rate in assignment securitization 
Tls  = bank’s tax rate in loan syndication 
To  = bank’s ordinary tax rate 
ψbbs = bank’s probability of bankruptcy before securitization transaction (Some borrowers may have a higher credit 
rating than the bank).    
ψbsa = bank’s probability of bankruptcy after securitization transaction.  
ψbbl = bank’s probability of bankruptcy before loan syndication transaction.  (Some borrowers may have a higher 
credit rating than the bank). 
ψbal = bank’s probability of bankruptcy after loan syndication transaction 
ψs = bank’s probability of successful loan syndications (syndication of pool of loans). 
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Vs = Volume of total securitized mortgage debt in the economy 
Vd = Volume of total bank deposits in the economy 
Vf = volume of debt borrowed by all banks in the economy from the Central Bank (US Fed)  
 
 
E1, E2, E3, E4 = with respect to organizational form of SPV, there are various states that correspond to the various 
possible corporate forms of the SPV.  The SPV can be an LLC (E1), LLP (E2), C-corporation (E3) or trust (E4), 
each of which has its unique tax benefits/problems, and degree of asset protection and limited liability under state 
laws. E0 is the optimal state during the life of the SPV, such that deviations from Eo (E0-Ei) measures the loss and 
opportunity cost arising from use of sub-optimal corporate structures as SPVs – such loss is typically in the form of 
increased legal fees, increased losses due to low limited-liability, and the value of extra time spent in dispute 
resolution.  
 
Ff, Fs = with respect to the form of financing, there are two states of the world – Ff, where the transaction is an 
assignment/financing, and Fs, where the transaction is a true sale.  In an assignment, the sponsor does not subsidize 
the SPV, but only substitutes impaired collateral.  Where Ff is the best/ideal state but Fs is being used, the 
transaction incurs losses, and vice versa; but where the correct transaction format is used, there is no loss/gain. 
Hence the value of the transaction format choice is F = Max[Ff - Fs, 0].  
 
A = value of the adverse selection problem.  Where the transaction is an assignment and the sponsor is the servicer, 
the sponsor will typically substitute impaired collateral, and hence has an incentive not to profer the best collateral 
as replacement. Where C0  = impaired collateral, Ci…..Cn = value of replacement collateral, and Ca is the value of 
average-quality collateral available for replacement and its assumed that collateral consist of units of the same or 
similar sizes; Pi = probability of there being impaired collateral; Pa = probability that the servicer/sponsor will offer 
medium-quality or low-quality collateral as replacement for the impaired collateral.  A = 0
t
 {(Ca)*Pi (1- Pa)} 
 
 
t = the period of time that it takes the bank to do one securitization transaction. 
 
Without securitization, the bank’s profit in time t  =  
   
      Ig = [Ii – Ilc – Il- Im - Max(If,Ib)] +  Igf 
 
Where the last term ( Igf) represents the present value of projected profits from additional loans based on this loan 
and funded by borrowing from the US Fed, using this loan as collateral. 
 
With securitization, the bank’s profit in time t is equal to:  
      Igs = [{(Ir-Ic-Ici-Ims-Its)(P)(S)(Ss)} +{(1 – Ss)(S)(Ii-Ilc-Its)} + {(1-S)( Ii – Ilc – Il- Max(If,Ib))} +  Igs ] - Max[Ff - 
Fs, 0] - Max[0, (E0-E1), (E0-E2), (E0-E3), (E0-E4)] - A 
 
 
Where  Igsf represents the present value of future gains from subsequent loans and securitizations after time t.  
Oldfield (2000). Passmore & Sparks (2000).  
 
Hence for the bank to profitably enter into securitization for time t, then the following conditions must exist: 
(1-Max{Tts,Ta}) 
1. Ii > Ispv > Max(Ib,If,0) 
2. [{(Ir-Ic-Its-Ici-Ims) (1-Max{Tts,Ta})(P)(S)(Ss)} +{(1 – Ss)(1-Max{Tts,Ta}) 
(S)(Ii-Ilc-Its)} + {(1-S) (1-Max{Tts,Ta})( Ii – Ilc – Il- Max(If,Ib))}+ Si+ Igs ] > [{Ii – Ilc – Ils-Max(If,Ib)-Im }(1-Max{Tls,To})*P] 
3. [{(Ir-Ic-Its-Ici-Ims)(P)(S)(Ss)} +{(1 – Ss)(S)(Ii-Ilc-Its)} + {(1-S)( Ii – Ilc – Il- Max(If,Ib))}+ Si+ Igs ] > [{Ii – Ilc – Ils-Max(If,Ib)-Im }*P] 
4. (Igs/Its) > Max[(Ig/Ii), 1] 
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5. (Prp/Ig)  < 1    
6. Max[(Ig/Im),1] < (Igs/Ims) 
7. Irc > Ii ;  Igs>0; Max[If, Ispv, Ib] < Ii;        
8. 3A/F3 >1 
9. 2Igs/If
2
 > Max[(Igs/If), (
2
Igs/Ib
2
), 1]; and Igs/If > Max[Igs/Ib, 1]    
10. 3Ib/Prp
3
  < Min[(3Ii/Prp
3
), 0] 
11. Prp > Pra; (Prp│Max(E1,E2,E3,E4) > Pra│Max(E1,E2,E3,E4) 
12. Im > Ims; {(Im│Max(E1,E2,E3,E4) > Ims│Max(E1,E2,E3,E4) 
13. Im│Max(Ff, Fs) > Ims│Max(Ff, Fs);    
14. Im│Max(Ff - Fs, 0). > Ims│Max(Ff - Fs, 0); and  Prp│Max(Ff - Fs, 0) > Pra│Max(Ff - Fs, 0); 
15. Il/tm  >  Max[Ils/tm, 0]    
16. [{(Ir-Ic-Its)(P)(S)(Ss)} +{(1 – Ss)(S)(Ii-Ilc-Its)} + {(1-S)( Ii – Ilc – Il- Max(If,Ib))} +  Igs ] < 0 
17. [{(Ir-Ic-Its)(P)(S)(Ss)} +{(1 – Ss)(S)(Ii-Ilc-Its)} + {(1-S)( Ii – Ilc – Il- Max(If,Ib))}] <0 
18. {Ii – Is – Its – Ic } < 0 
19. (2Vs/VdVf ) > 1   
20. Ispv/Vs > Max[Ib/Vd, 0];                       
21. 2Ispv/VdVf > 0; 
2
Ib/VdVf > 0;  
22. 3Igs/VsVdVf > 0 ; 
23. Igs/Vs > 1; Igs/VfVd > 0 
24. If/Vf > Id/Vd      
25. Igs > Igs;  (Ig/Ics) > Min[(Igs/Ils, 1]; (
2
Igs/Ics
2
)  > Min[(2Igs/
2
Ils
2
, 1]      
26. (S/Ii) > Max[(S/Ispv), 1]; (
2
S/Ii
2
) > Max[(2S/Ispv
2
), 1];    
27. Ims/Itts > 1               
28. S/(ψbbs- ψbsa) > Max[P/(ψbbl-ψbal), 1]             
29. 2S/Ss(ψbbs-ψbsa)  > Max[
2
S/(ψbbs-ψbbs)
2
, 0]           
 
 
In order to create a decision model, weights (x1…..xn) and scores (y1…..yn) can be assigned to each of 
these conditions, subject to ∑xn = 1; and the sum of the weighted scores can serve as the decision indicator.  The 
decision maker can then choose/apply various thresholds between 0 and 1. 
 
 
3. The Bank’s Objective Function. 
The bank’s multi-criteria objective function will be: 
Max [{(Ir-Ic-Its-Ici-Ims)(P)(S)(Ss)} +{(1 – Ss)(S)(Ii-Ilc-Its)} + {(1-S)(Ii – Ilc – Il- Max(If,Ib))}+  Igs ] 
 
Hence, banks and financial institutions will continue to engage in securitization until their transaction 
costs, credit loss risks and spreads preclude further transactions.  Carlstrom & Samolyk (1993); Donahoo & 
Shaffer (1991); Hendershott & Van Order (1989); Greenbaum & Thakor (1987).  Generally, as the volume of 
securitized mortgage debt (Vs) increases, its expected that:  
 
Ispv  Ib, and  
Is/Ib < 0; until investors will become indifferent between Ispv and Ib.  
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Dionne & Harchaoui (2003) studied the impact of securitization and credit risk on banks’ capital and found 
that : 1) securitization has negative effects on both Tier-1 capital ratios and Total risk-based capital ratios; 2) there 
is a positive statistically significant  relationship between securitization and banks’ risk.  Similarly, some 
researchers found that under the current capital requirements for credit risk, banks may be induced to (and have 
substantial incentives to) shift to more risky assets (loans).  Donahoo & Shaffer (1991).    
Its conjectured here that securitization negates bank capital-reserve-requirements regulations by providing 
incentives for banks to take excessive risks.  So long as banks can purchase and securitize highly risky assets 
through true-sale securitizations, current bank capital-reserve-requirements in most jurisdictions (even those that 
purport to incorporate the risk of banks’ off-balance sheet activities) don’t preclude financial institution failures.  
Greenbaum & Thakor (1987); Donahoo & Shaffer (1991); Murray (2001); Winton (2001); Naranjo & Toevs  
(2003).   
 
4. Optimal Amount Of Securitization For A Bank 
 As explained in the preceding sections, the decision to securitize assets (both true-sale and assignment 
securitizations) is not affected by existing bank capital-reserve requirements.  Berger & Udell (1994);  Chakraborty 
& Ray (2006); Allen & Carletti (2006); Cooper (2001); Browning, Gronsberg & Liu (_____); DeYoung & Rice 
(2004); Krainer (2002); Naranjo & Toevs (2003); Greenbaum & Thakor (1987);  Donahoo & Shaffer (1991); 
Cosimano & McDonald (1998); Naranjo & Toevs (2003).  Its assumed that all securitization transactions earn net-
spreads (net of monitoring costs, transaction costs, cost of credit losses, cost of credit enhancements, and 
administration costs) for the bank-sponsors, otherwise the bank-sponsor will not undertake the transactions. The 
months and months and months that the In most securitizations, credit losses are typically low (less than 5%), and 
standard over-collateralization and true-sales eliminates any recourse to the sponsor bank.  Thus, the magnitude 
and probability of Asset Substitution are not constraints on, or even minor causal factors for the bank’s optimal 
securitization volume.  Theoretically, a bank’s positive net-spreads from securitization are not perpetual but is 
limited/constrained by the following factors:  
a) The available volume of assets/loans that can be securitized is finite;  
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b) Investors are knowledgeable and can buy other assets instead of ABS/MBS and or re-allocate capital from ABS-
MBS to other securities/assets;  
c) There are other banks and financial institutions and sponsors that will issue ABS/MBS and seek similar spreads.   
 
Therefore, the optimal amount of securitization for a specific bank is determined mostly by external factors 
that affect the overall banking/capital markets; and is a function of the following:   
a) The available volume of assets/loans that can be securitized, which is finite;  
b) Investors are knowledgeable and can buy other assets instead of ABS/MBS;  
c) There are other banks and financial institutions and sponsors that will issue ABS/MBS;  
d) The asset class (ie. – leases vs. mortgages vs. healthcare receivables, etc.).  The optimum securitization volume 
for any varies by assets class, because class characteristics vary substantially, and relative risk is evaluated 
differently for each asset class.      
e) The investors’ average propensity to substitute a specific class of ABS/MBS with another security;  
f) The marginal yield on ABS/MBS;  
g) the ratio of the bank’s total capital to the sum of the total capital of all banks/sponsors/financial institutions that 
can issue ABS/MBS in that asset class; and a former  
h) The bank’s long run market share in the ABS/MBS sector (this is a function of the bank’s marketing prowess, 
knowledge about origination/structuring/hedging/trading of ABS/MBS, and social capital).  
Hence the optimal ABS/MBS volume in an asset-class for a bank, occurs at that ABS/MBS dollar-volume 
where the following conditions exist:  
a) Mmys = Mcm; Sc ≥ Sh  
b) [(Vm)*(Sc)] ≥ [(Sh)*(V p)]     
c) Vp > (Sc *Vm )  
d) Mmys ≥ [(Mcm *Rsn*Φ) + (Mays *Rss*Ω)]       
e) (∂Rss/∂Vm) < 1; and (∂
2
Rsn/∂Vm
2
) < 0;     
f) ∂Rsn/∂Vp <0; and (∂
2
Rss/∂Vm
2
) < 0;      
g) Mmys ≥ (Mcm * Rss) 
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Where:   
Φ, Ω = Φ is the relative impact of the non-ABS/MBS capital markets; and Ω is the relative impact of the 
ABS/MBS market.  Φ + Ω =1; 0 < Φ < 1; 0 < Ω < 1.   
Mmys = the marginal Modified-Duration on the average ABS/MBS in the asset class (ie. leases vs. business loans 
vs. mortgages vs. healthcare receivables vs. aircraft receivables, etc.).  -∞ < Mmys < +∞.   
Mcm -= the average Modified-Duration of comparable non-ABS/MBS securities with similar characteristics 
(duration, coupon, term, etc.).  -∞ < Mcm < +∞.   
Mays = the average Modified-Duration of comparable ABS/MBS securities in the same asset class, with similar 
characteristics (duration, coupon, term, etc.).  -∞ < Mays < +∞.   
Rsn = the average investor’s marginal rate of substitution of ABS/MBS for another non-ABS/MBS security.  -∞ < 
Rsn < +∞.      
Rss = the average investor’s marginal rate of substitution of ABS/MBS for another ABS/MBS in the same asset 
class.  -∞ < Rss < +∞.      
Vm = actual total dollar volume of ABS/MBS market segment.  This includes only securitized assets in the 
segment.  0 < Vm < +∞.      
Vp = potential dollar volume of ABS/MBS market segment – this includes both securitized and un-securitized 
assets in the asset-class/segment.  0 < Vp < +∞.  In reality, this amount varies continuously, but for this analysis, its 
assumed that the optimal amount of securitization is as of a specific point in time.      
Sh = the bank’s historical market share in the ABS/MBS segment.  0 < Sh < 1.      
Sc  = the bank’s current market share in the ABS/MBS segment.  0 < Sc <1.       
 
5. Conclusion.  
Although Securitization is illegal (see Nwogugu (2005)), it has radically altered the structures of the 
financial services industry and the real estate industry, and coupled with the Internet, can have a major impact on 
the characteristics/regulation of property acquisition/disposition processes.  This article has shown that 
securitization may or may not be beneficial for banks, depending on interest rates, transaction costs, monitoring 
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costs, information-diffusion rates, marginal propensity to substitute ABS/MBS for other assets, market 
completeness, and the rate at which arbitrage opportunities dissipate in the capital markets.   
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